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Viewing cable 09CAIRO119, SCENESETTER FOR SPECIAL ENVOY MITCHELL'S JANUARY 26 VISIT TO CAIRO REF: CAIRO 118 (ASSESSMENT POST-GAZA) Classified By: Ambassador Margaret Scobey Reasons: 1.4 (B) and (D)

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09CAIRO119 2009-01-23 19:07 2011-02-16 21:09 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Cairo
O 231954Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1440
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
S E C R E T CAIRO 000119 
 
 
NOFORN 
 
FOR SENATOR MITCHELL FROM THE AMBASSADOR 
ALSO PASS TO NSC FOR SHAPIRO AND PASCUAL; NEA FOR FO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPAL IS EG
 
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SPECIAL ENVOY MITCHELL'S JANUARY 26 VISIT TO CAIRO REF: CAIRO 118 (ASSESSMENT POST-GAZA) Classified By: Ambassador Margaret Scobey Reasons: 1.4 (B) and (D)
1. (S/NF) Summary and Introduction: Senator Mitchell, welcome to Egypt. Your visit will be, we hope, the first in a regular process of dialogue and consultation with senior Egyptians on what they consider to be the primary regional political issue -- the Arab-Israeli conflict, particularly the Palestinian track that has generated violence and tension that threatens Egypt's national security interests.

2. (S/NF) We have requested meetings with President Mubarak, EGIS Chief General Omar Soliman, Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit and Arab League Secretary General Amre Moussa. The Egyptian leadership will hope to see in your visit signs that the U.S. will give urgency to addressing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and a hope that the U.S. approach will be seen as balanced. Healing the Palestinian rift is critical, but may hinge on re-establishing a Syrian track in the peace process. Egyptian-Syrian relations, never good, are particularly hostile at this juncture with Mubarak seeing Syria acting aggressively as Tehran's proxy in undermining Egyptian Arab leadership. It will be important for us to consult closely with the GOE on our approach to Syria and Lebanon because of Egypt's overriding strategic view of the Iranian threat. GOE anger over what they perceived as U.S. intervention in Iraq that did not heed the advice and interests of regional partners like Egypt has abated somewhat, but President Mubarak believes that the post-Saddam vacuum has unleashed Iranian regional ambitions, including now in Gaza via Hamas. End summary. --------------------------------------------- ------------ The Egyptian Approach on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict --------------------------------------------- ------------

3. (S/NF) Resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the primary strategic political goal for the Egyptians. Over the years, the Egyptians have functioned well as an intermediary (e.g. between Arafat and the Israelis), a role that effectively balanced Egypt's moderate stance alongside its regional image as standard-bearer for the Palestinian cause. With the emergence of direct Israeli-Palestinian Authority communication, followed by the Hamas coup of Gaza in June, 2007, the Egyptian role shifted to a focus on intra-Palestinian reconciliation and establishment of the Hamas-Israel ceasefire. Egyptians have welcomed signs from the Obama Administration that the U.S. intends to engage early; Foreign Minister Abul Ghayt warned a few days ago that "others" (Turkey, the French, Qatar to name a few) are actively jockeying to expand their role in brokering peace during a period of perceived U.S. inattention. The Egyptians have fretted, however,about the possibility that renewed U.S. engagement would devolve into endless "process." They support direct Palestinian-Israeli negotiations but want to see the U.S. using its influence with the parties more effectively.

4. (S/NF) EGIS Chief Omar Soliman, 72 years old and in his position since 1993, is the de facto national security advisor, and holds responsibility for the Israeli-Palestinian account, including Egyptian efforts to negotiate the release of IDF Corporal Gilad Shalit. Soliman, a retired general and veteran of the 1973 war, is a pragmatist with an extremely sharp analytical mind. He currently is hosting a series of meetings with Israeli MOD Official Amos Gilad and Hamas representatives (from both Gaza and Damascus), with the goal of cementing the new ceasefire and advancing intra-Palestinian reconciliation. Soliman believes that Palestinian reconciliation is a prerequisite to any major next step in Gaza, as neither the Egyptians nor the international community can work with Hamas as a partner on security, political or economic reconstruction issues. That said, he has stuggled to find incentives for Hamas to cede Gaza back to the PA, especially given Hamas' increasingly stout backing from some Arab states (e.g. Syria and Qatar) as well as Iran. Soliman will tell you he understands that Hamas needs to be "squeezed" and that limiting movement in and out of Gaza supports this end, but will urge that you impress upon the Israelis the need to maintain adequate humanitarian inflows to Gaza. The Egyptians will stress the point that that keeping borders open for legitimate trade and forging effective measures against smuggling go hand in hand.

5.(S/NF) Following his most recent round of discussions with Gilad, Soliman told us that he and Gilad generally agreed that they were "back where they started" in the fall -- only perhaps Hamas has gotten meaner. Together they inted to work to extend the calm and promote Palestiian reconciliation. As long as the calm lasts, srael will proceed, as before, with limited bordr openings for legitimate goods. On counter-smugling, Soliman said he told Gilad that Egypt has ade new "arrangements for border security" that ill involve EGIS, State Security and DMI. He pldged to Gilad that Egypt would exert maximum effor to control borders including areas of the Gulfs of Suez and Aqaba. The Egyptian Prime Minister will address compensation for Sinai Bedouin to alleviate the impact of cutting off smuggling. He said Egypt would accept technology from the U.S., Germany and Italy and that Egypt would arrest owners of the tunnels. Gilad and Soliman reportedly agreed that Hamas knows its resupply challenges will grow but that their efforts to succeed will also increase.

6.(S/NF) The Egyptians are also in the midst of a serious intra-Arab rift, exposed by the recent Gaza crisis (for a full analysis see reftel). The Israeli military operation, and enormous regional public outcry, appears to have buoyed Hamas' popularity for the moment. Egypt, with support primarily from Saudi Arabia, has pushed back against Arab and other states that wish to give greater political recognition to Hamas, but the fight will likely intensify in the run-up to the Arab League Annual Summit set for late March in Doha. FM Aboul Gheit, a career diplomat who has held his position since 2004, recently announced Egypt's intent to hold a ministerial level meeting on Gaza humanitarian assistance as soon as mid-February, something that he hopes will marginalize efforts from other Arab states to channel assistance to Gaza via contributions to Hamas. He will likely ask for full USG support of this initiative. Arab League Secretary General Amre Moussa (in office since 2001) is generally supportive of Egyptian primacy on the Palestinian issue and of PA President Abbas. He has struggled to regain control of intra-Arab dynamics following the Gaza crisis). Your tentatively scheduled visit will give him a needed boost.

7. (S/NF) Your key meeting however will be with President Mubarak who retains a firm grip on national security and strategic issues. EGIS Director Soliman and FM Aboul Gheit take their marching orders from Mubarak and are effective to the extent that Mubarak and Egypt are still seen both in the region and on the international stage as indispensible partners in seeking Arab-Israeli peace. With Iran making inroads into the Arab world via Syria, Hezbollah, Qatar, and now Hamas, Mubarak will be most open to a USG approach that puts our efforts on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in that broader regional context. Reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas may be the critical piece to reestablishing a meaningful path towards the objective of a two-state solution, but in our view that is unlikely to take place without broader reconciliation within Arab ranks. Mubarak's feelings towards Syria and Bashar al-Assad are scathing, but at the same time we believe he will understand that prying Syria away from Iran and establishing a Syrian-Israeli track may be a strategic necessity. You will want to seek his views on this issue and assure him that the U.S. will consult closely with Egypt as we consider any overtures towards Syria. --------------- Regional Issues ---------------

8. (S/NF) On Iraq, although President Mubarak remains deeply suspicious that Nuri Al Maliki answers to Tehran, other GOE officials have expressed increasing confidence that Maliki, and Iraq generally, has turned a corner and may avoid civil war. Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit recently completed a successful trip to Baghdad in October and is moving forward to reopen the Embassy in Baghdad. On Iran, Egypt is concerned by rising Iranian influence in the region, has supported UN sanctions, and is increasingly active on countering Iran, e.g. in Gaza and to some extent in Lebanon, working with Saudi Arabia and other Arab states to support Lebanese political and territorial sovereignty.

9.(S/NF) Egypt is a steadfast ally in counter-terrorism efforts, and we maintain close cooperation on a broad range of security and law enforcement issues. We have a long-standing and productive relationship with EGIS and SSIS, the two Egyptian agencies that cover internal and regional terrorism issues. Through the Department of State's Anti-Terrorism Assistance program, we are working with SSIS to establish an anti-terror investigative unit, and also are in the beginning stages of a USG-funded community policing program that will include needed human rights training. ------------------------------- Internal Politics and Economics -------------------------------

10. (C) Our fundamental political reform goal in Egypt remains democratic transformation, including the expansion of political freedom and pluralism, respect for human rights, and a stable and legitimate transition to the post-Mubarak era. Egyptian democracy and human rights efforts, however, are being suffocated, and Mubarak remains skeptical of our role in democracy promotion, lecturing us that any efforts to open up will result in empowering the Muslim Brotherhood (which currently holds 86 seats in Egypt's parliament). Mubarak now makes scant public pretense of advancing a vision for democratic change. An ongoing challenge remains balancing our security interests with our democracy promotion efforts.

11.(S/NF) Mubarak, who is now 80, is in solid health, notwithstanding a hearing deficit in his left ear. The next presidential elections are scheduled for 2011, and if Mubarak is still alive it is likely he will run again, and, inevitably, win. Despite incessant whispered discussions, no one in Egypt has any certainty about who will eventually succeed Mubarak, nor how the succession will happen. Mubarak himself seems to be trusting to God and the inertia of the military and civilian security services to ensure an orderly transition. The most likely contenders for next president are presidential son Gamal Mubarak (whose profile is ever-increasing at the ruling party), EGIS chief Omar Soliman, dark horse Arab League Secretary-General Amre Moussa, another old-guard regime insider, or an as-yet unknown military officer.

12. (C) Economic reform has been a success story, although Egypt still suffers from widespread and so far irremediable poverty affecting upwards of 35-40% of the population. Reforms in trade and tax policy, financial reform, privatization and increased transparency have led to 7% economic growth in the last fiscal year. Foreign investment increased from around $3 billion in 2005 to $11 billion in the last year, mostly in the petroleum sector. Despite this success, significant problems remain, including 20% inflation, high levels of poverty and unemployment, and endemic corruption. The effects of the global financial crisis on Egypt may not be as severe as elsewhere, as Egyptian banks operate very conservatively and have been spared involvement in risky financial products. The informal economy also provides a certain degree of resiliency to the economic picture. Nevertheless, as the economic crisis worsens, Egypt remains vulnerable as exports, Suez canal revenues, tourism, and remittances will reflect global trends. SCOBEY