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Viewing cable 06THEHAGUE1739, NETHERLANDS/JSF/C-17/LEBANON/AFGHANISTAN: MEETING

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06THEHAGUE1739 2006-08-09 14:02 2011-01-17 00:12 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy The Hague
VZCZCXYZ0013
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTC #1739/01 2211400
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 091400Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6508
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 0188
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0187
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 001739 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/RPM, EUR/UBI 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/09/2016 
TAGS: MARR PGOV PREL NL LE AF
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/JSF/C-17/LEBANON/AFGHANISTAN: MEETING 
WITH DEFENSE MINSTER KAMP 
 
...



74239,8/9/2006 14:00,06THEHAGUE1739,"Embassy The
Hague",CONFIDENTIAL,06KABUL3440,"VZCZCXYZ0013
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHTC #1739/01 2211400
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 091400Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6508
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 0188
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0187
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
","C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 001739
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/RPM, EUR/UBI
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/09/2016
TAGS: MARR PGOV PREL NL LE AF
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/JSF/C-17/LEBANON/AFGHANISTAN: MEETING
WITH DEFENSE MINSTER KAMP
REF: KABUL 3440

Classified By: Ambassador Roland Arnall, reasons 1.4 (b,d)
1. (C) Summary: Defense Minister Henk Kamp said the GONL is
committed to the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program, and
hopes to sign the follow-on MOU prior to the parliamentary
elections on November 22. He said the GONL remains
interested in the NATO C-17 consortium, and is actively
reviewing funding options. Kamp reiterated that Dutch forces
were currently spread too thin to make a significant
operational contribution to an International Force (IF) in
Lebanon, but did not rule out the possibility of a naval
contribution at some point provided there was a ""serious""
need. The GONL continues to appreciate USG support to the
Dutch ISAF III deployment in Afghanistan. With the exception
of a few difficulties -- now resolved -- Kamp claimed that
the Dutch deployment is ""on track."" He discussed these
issues with Ambassador Arnall on August 9. End summary.

JSF: Committed
--------------

2. (C) Kamp said that the GONL remains seriously committed to
JSF -- not only is the program the best available, but it is
also important for the U.S-Dutch relationship. He said the
GONL intends to sign the follow-on MOU, and would make a
decision regarding the timing of the signature in the near
future. He hoped to sign the follow-on MOU prior to the
parliamentary elections on November 22. However, Kamp was
not concerned if signature slipped until after the elections.
He explained that the main opposition Labor Party (PvdA) was
in government during the program's initiation, and had
supported JSF. If Labor was a part of the next government
coalition -- as current polls suggest -- Kamp believed
chances were good they would support continuing the program,
despite current political posturing to the contrary.

3. (C) In a separate conversation, MOD State Secretary Cees
van der Knaap told Ambassador Arnall August 9 that the GONL
still intends to sign the follow-on MOU prior to the
parliamentary elections. Amb. Arnall informed van der Knaap
of our intentions to meet with Dutch Parliamentary Defense
Committee members prior to their trip to Washington and Ft.
Worth to discuss JSF. Van der Knaap welcomed such
discussion, but requested that the USG think and act
""carefully"" given the political sensitivities.

C-17 Consortium: Continued Interest
-----------------------------------

4. (C) Kamp confirmed that the Dutch remain very interested
in participating in the NATO C-17 consortium. He explained
that the financial aspects of Dutch participation have not
yet been resolved, as the GONL is trying to determine whether
the program should be funded by the MFA -- as a strategic
airlift initiative -- or MOD -- as a defense acquisition. He
added that the MFA and MOD are actively discussing the matter
with the intention of requesting additional funding from
Dutch Finance Minister Zalm in the coming weeks in order to
participate in the consortium.

Lebanon: Dutch Stretched Thin; ""Serious"" Naval Ops Possible
--------------------------------------------- --------------

5. (C) Amb. Arnall noted the GONL's position -- stated
publicly by Kamp and Foreign Minister Bot -- that the Dutch
were ""stretched too thin"" to be able to contribute to the
International Force (IF) in Lebanon. Kamp confirmed that was
the case, noting that the GONL would like to get involved and
that he personally was a strong advocate of Israel. However,
he explained that the Dutch want to ""do current missions one
hundred percent"" -- contributing to the IF would detract from
this goal.

6. (C) Amb. Arnall asked if the Dutch in the future might
consider a naval contribution to the IF. Kamp replied that
the Dutch might be interested, as the Dutch navy is ""very
capable."" But the mission would need to be a ""serious task""
to warrant consideration, he added. He mentioned Dutch
support to UNMIL off the coast of Liberia in late 2003, in
which Dutch personnel were not seriously engaged for three
months -- this was ""not good for Dutch personnel,"" Kamp said.

Afghanistan: On Track
---------------------

7. (C) Amb. Arnall expressed his condolences to Kamp for the
recent loss of two Dutch soldiers in a helicopter crash in
eastern Afghanistan, and noted continued USG appreciation for
the Dutch commitment to the ISAF III mission in Uruzgan. He
commended Kamp on the Dutch MOD's public relations campaign
to promote the mission and build public support.

8. (C) Kamp thanked the USG for its support in Uruzgan,
especially regarding the use of U.S. medevac and Apache
helicopters, and C-17 airlift support. He praised previous
and continued efforts in Uruzgan, and noted that he was
making efforts to explain to the Dutch public that the USG
""did a lot of good"" in Uruzgan -- the GONL hopes to build
upon the solid foundation initiated by the USG. He also
appreciated the continued U.S. presence in the PRT in Tarin
Kowt, which is helping bolster coordination among NATO
allies. That said, Kamp noted there were a few
""difficulties"" (reftel) in the transition from the US- to
Dutch-led PRT in Tarin Kowt, especially regarding
communication on what the USG intended to take and leave
behind in the PRT. Kamp said these ""difficulties"" were now
resolved.
ARNALL